BOOK REVIEW
THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES. By Bruce Allen Murphy. Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. x, 473. Price $18.95.
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This challenging and suprising book documents in great detail the extensive extrajudicial activities of two of the most noted
Associate Justices in the history of the Supreme Court. Its publication stimulated an unusual flurry of public interest and news
stories, with implications that the activities revealed were violative
of judicial ethical standards." Actually, the "revelations" were
not all that new. Murphy and an associate had previously published much of the material on the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection in law reviews; 2 Philippa Strum had vritten about Brandeis'
contacts with President Roosevelt, 3 and Felix Frankfurter's wide4
ranging interests had been recounted by H. N. Hirsch.
Moreover, the idea that Supreme Court justices begin a monkish separation from the world of affairs when they go on the bench
has never been held by those who know the history of the Court.5
As Murphy says, "the whole notion of a judiciary totally secluded
from politics appears to be more myth than history. Fully twothirds of the 102 people who have served on the Court have enf Professor Emeritus, University of California, Santa Barbara. B.A. 1927,
Millikin University; Ph.D. 1937, University of Chicago. Author: ThE RoosEWv-T
CoURT; CIVI LMEarXEs AND TE VINsoN CoURT; CONGRESS VR1sUs T
SUPRE M
CoUr.
-1In an editorial the New York Times found the disclosures "dismaying," and
went on: "The Brandeis-Frankfurter arrangement was wrong. It serves neither
history nor ethics to judge it more kindly." N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982 at A22,
col. 1. Extended news stories by David Margolick and a letter in defense of Justice
Brandeis by Nanette Dembitz also appeared in the New York Times. Id. Feb. 14,
1982 at Al, col. 3, Feb. 16, 1982 at A16, col 3, and Mar. 6, 1982 at A22, col 1.
2 Murphy, Elements of Extrajudicial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles of
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, 69 GEO. LJ. 101 (1980); Levy and Murphy,
Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint Efforts of
Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, 78 Mimo. L. Buv. 1252 (1980).
3 Justice Brandeis and President Roosevelt in W. Murn
and C. Pnrrcsyr,
CounTs, JUDGEs, Aim Poramcs 187-190 (1979).
4 H. HImscn, Tim Earc.A OF FELx FRANxFTER (1981).
5 See Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973
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gaged in some form of extrajudicial political behavior...."
These
activities have included advising presidents, suggesting legislation
to Congress, proposing appointments, participating in diplomatic
missions, writing articles, delivering speeches, and sitting on official government tribunals. Why, then, did the Brandeis and
Frankfurter activities attract such attention?
One reason is that both were unusually active in promoting
their policy concerns off the bench. They undoubtedly breached
the concept of judicial noninvolvement in politics as much as any
Justice has ever done, at least in this century. But there were two
additional factors that seemed to make their story unique. One
was the fact that Brandeis largely carried on his policy activities
in a sub rosa fashion through a younger operative, Felix Frankfurter, who himself later became a Supreme Court justice and continued the Brandeis practice of "meddling" in public affairs.
Second was the fact, which few had previously known, that Brandeis
had paid Frankfurter up to $3,500 a year to reimburse him for
time spent in pro bono activities. 7 It was this smell of money
that was partly responsible for the attention paid the book on
publication."
As a Boston lawyer Brandeis' dedication to many liberal causes
had made him anathema in the utility, industrial, and financial
worlds. 9 During President Wilson's first term he was the President's chief adviser on industrial and financial matters, and influenced a number of key appointments. After surviving the bitter
Senate fight on his appointment to the Court in 1916, Justice
Brandeis faced a dilemma. His first reaction was to drop all his
outside activities, but he soon found such isolation unendurable.
He resolved his dilemma by recruiting the dynamic young friend
whom he had known since 1911, and who in 1914 had become a
professor at Harvard Law School, to act as his eyes and ears, and
to promote the policies to which both were committed.
Despite the availability of Frankfurter as an intermediary,
however, Brandeis carried on many activities directly. He had contacts throughout the Wilson administration and at the top level
6 B. MuRPHY, ThE BtnDEiS/FRANKF-RTE
7

CONNECTION 7 (1982).

fHirsch had told of these payments in his 1981 book on Frankfurter. H.
HniscH, supra note 4, at 47.
8 A headline in the Los Angeles Times read: Brandeis Paid FrankfurterSecretly
to Publicize Views. L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1982, Part I, at 5, col. 1.
9 See the account of the Senate fight on the confirmation of Brandeis in A.
MASON, BPAnzs: A F=. MAN'S LFE 465-508 (1946).
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in the Justice, Treasury, War, and Navy Departments."0 He received a steady flow of information from members of the independent regulatory commissions.": President Wilson asked him
to work with Colonel House in accumulating information for the
drawing up of a peace treaty. 12 He was responsible for the appointment of Herbert Hoover as Food Administrator, and he advised
Hoover on how to secure enactment of the Lever Food Control
bill.' s Through Hoover he recommended a Russian policy similar to the later Marshall Plan.14 He proposed reorganization and
streamlining of the War Department, and when Secretary Newton
D. Baker resisted, Brandeis sought through Colonel House to have
Baker removed. 15 When Brandeis' suggestion to create a War
Labor Policies Board was accepted in 1918, Frankfurter proposed
that Brandeis be named its chairman without resigning from the
Court, but Wilson named Frankfurter instead.16 During this
period Brandeis was also using all his administrative contacts to
further the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine; "few
men had more impact on the creation of the state of Palestine." 1
Yet in spite of all his war-related activities, Brandeis wrote virtually the same number of opinions for the Court during each of
the war years as he did later on. .
In the postwar period, the Sacco-Vanzetti case created a cruel
challenge for Brandeis.' 8 Behind the scenes he encouraged Frankfurter to argue the case for them in print, but later when their
attorneys petitioned him to stay their execution, he avoided any
ethical question by disqualifying himself. When liberals criticized
Brandeis for refusing to intervene, Frankfurter arranged for an
explanation and defense of Brandeis' action to be published in
The New Republic. Brandeis had a strong interest in this journal,
with which Frankfurter was closely connected, and often gave
Frankfurter suggestions for articles, which the latter would then
present to the editors as his own ideas. Brandeis would also send
10B. Mmuiy, supra note 6, at 48. President Wilson once went to Brandeis'
apartment to get his advice on the appointment of W. G. McAdoo as wartime
operator of the railroads. Id. 47.
1Id. 50.
12 Id.

18 Id. 55. But he later voted to declare portions of the act unconstitutional. Id.
14 Id. 51.
15 Id. 53.
16 Id.

Id. 64.
18 Id. 78-81.
'7
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comments on current affairs to Frankfurter, which then appeared
as unsigned articles or editorials. 19 All through the 1920s he carried on a behind-the-scenes educational campaign for unemployment insurance.20 In 1931 he launched through Frankfurter a
campaign for tax reform that would increase taxes for the "super
21
rich," a class that included himself.
With the election of Roosevelt, Frankfurter's influence potential greatly increased. Frankfurter had known Roosevelt since
World War I and was active in the 1932 campaign. Roosevelt
promptly offered him the post of Solicitor General, but Frankfurter declined, at least in part on Brandeis' urging, thus choosing
to remain behind the scenes and to retain his long-time role as
"central lieutenant" for Brandeis.2 2 Frankfurter was responsible
for the first meeting between Roosevelt and Brandeis. Finding
the President interested, Brandeis prepared an elaborate program
for public works and tax and banking reform. But his dislike of
monopolies and big government conflicted with the ideas of the
planners and collectivists in the Brains Trust, and he was ineffective in the early days of the New Deal. 23

In the meantime, Frankfurter was busy placing his Harvard
students in key positions in Washington. The famous pair of
Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen were drafting legislation
for reform of the stock market and investment practices, and they
got many of their ideas from Brandeis through a circular route of
intermediaries.2 4 Through dinners and weekly teas Brandeis kept
in touch with everything that was going on.25 Through Frankfurter he was an active force in development of unemployment insurance legislation, though he was unhappy with the compromise
eventually written into the 1935 act. 26

Brandeis was part of the unanimous Court which on May 27,
1935, handed Roosevelt a triple rebuff, declaring unconstitutional
the NRA, 27 the Frazier-Lemke farm mortgage act, 28 and the re19 Id. 89-91.
201d.93-96.
21 Id.92.
22 Id.102.

Id.106-08.
24 Id. 131-33.

2Id. 120-22.
26 Id. 165-78.
27
28

Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
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moval of a Federal Trade Commissioner.29 But it was Roosevet's
"Court-packing plan" that brought about the destruction of
Brandeis' standing with the President and also substantially terminated the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection. 0 At the age of 80,
the oldest member of the Court, Brandeis particularly resented
Roosevelt's charge that the Court was behind in its work and
needed "new and younger blood." As usual, he worked through
an intermediary, suggesting to Senator Burton K. Wheeler that
he ask Chief Justice Hughes to answer the charge of judicial inefficiency. In the resulting letter, which Wheeler used most effectively against the plan, Hughes specifically noted that in writing
it he had consulted his colleagues Brandeis and VanDevanter.
While Frankfurter had taken no public position on the Courtpacking plan and was personally ambivalent about it, he resented
Brandeis' action and subsequent relations between them were
strained. 1 Brandeis retired on February 13, 1939, two weeks after
Frankfurter had joined the Court as successor to the late Justice
Benjamin Cardozo.
The "Brandeis-Frankfurter connection" ends here, but Murphy

proceeds through another 150 pages to detail the extrajudicial activities of Justice Frankfurter, which were easily as spectacular as
those of his mentor. But the author concludes that Frankfurter
was somewhat more troubled about the ethics of his off-the-bench
role than Brandeis had been.3 2 He made repeated public protestations of his judicial purity, while accommodating his political activities by developing a kind of split personality, a "double Felix."
While the private Felix became in his own time on the
bench one of the all-time leaders in political involvement
by a Supreme Court justice, the public Felix went to incredible lengths to present just the opposite image. He
continually denied his own involvement in activities in
which he was deeply involved, set stiff standards for the
behavior of others, and, even while violating these standards himself, severely criticized those who failed to observe
them. 33
William 0. Douglas was his particular target.

Murphy de-

votes considerable attention to Frankfurter's attacks on Douglas,
29

Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
0B. MuRPHY, supra note 6, at 178-80.
31 Id. 181.
32 Id. 258.
3 Id. 259.
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which he thinks were "far more intense than the latter's actions
warranted." 34 He even speculates that Frankfurter, who as a naturalized citizen was not eligible for the presidency, resented talk
about Douglas for president.
Murphy was puzzled, in interviewing some former Frankfurter
clerks, to find that they were almost completely unaware of his
political contacts, which were especially intense during the wartime
period. He believes that the Justice maintained a separation between his political and judicial worlds in part by an ingenious
arrangement of his three-office suite.3 5 Instead of installing himself in the luxurious inner office, designed for the judicial occupant with a fireplace and shower facilities, he gave that office to
his law clerk (there was only one at that time) and took the smaller
middle office for himself. Consequently visitors could come in
through the outer reception area unnoticed by the law clerk.
Murphy believes that from his book some of Frankfurter's law
clerks will learn for the first time how fully the Justice compartmentalized the two sides of his personality "in a careful use of
two distinct sets of lieutenants." 81
Only a sampling of Frankfurter's operations can be given.
For example, he found out about the super-secret Manhattan
Project, and enlisted Niels Bohr to join him in a direct but unsuccessful effort to get Roosevelt and Churchill interested in the
international control of nuclear weapons.3 7 He gave Secretary
Stimson an advisory opinion that the proposed "destroyer-for-bases
deal" with Britain was constitutional.3 8 He provided FDR with
one of his most famous phrases-that the United States must be
"the great arsenal of democracy." 39 He played a dominant role
in writing the Lend-Lease Act, and suggested the remarkable public relations stroke of giving it the number of House Resolution
1776.40 He facilitated the success of a 1941 meeting between
Churchill and Harry Hopkins. 4 - He prevented Donald Nelson
from being replaced by Bernard Baruch as head of the War Production Board. 42
id. 262.
35 Id. 271.
36 Id. 270.
37 Id. 297-301.
38 Id. 211.
39 Id. 214.
34

40

Id. 217-19.

41 Id. 216.
42

Id. 244.
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What conclusions can be reached on the basis of this revealing study? First, the financial arrangements between Brandeis
and Frankfurter seem of minor importance. On an academic
salary and wiih his wife's medical expenses, Frankfurter needed
assistance if he was to be Brandeis' pro bono aide and give up
other opportunities for professional remuneration. The serious
question is whether the two justices violated any judicial norms
or expectations.
As already noted, there has been a long record of extrajudicial
operations and contacts of various sorts by the justices. Murphy
supplies a very convenient "Survey of Justices in Politics from
1789 to 1916" in an appendix. 43 Moreover, the early service of
both Justices was during wartime, when they would have felt patriotic pressures to promote the war effort. Murphy suggests that
their activities were "not much different in kind from the endeavors of other justices, such as Joseph Story in the War of 1812
[and] John A. Campbell and Samuel Nelson in the Civil
44
War ...
But there were differences in degree of political involvement
that do distinguish the pair from the great majority of their
brethren. And though neither could properly be credited with a
"judicial temperament," they were otherwise dissimilar. Murphy
sees Brandeis as "a visionary prophet," a "reserved ascetic," issuing his prophecies from a distance and waiting for others to
secure their adoption. 45 Frankfurter was the opposite-a teacher,
a political man, "an incessant meddler: aggressive, bold, and relentless in pursuit of each small tactical victory." 43

It is significant that both Brandeis and Frankfurter felt under
an obligation to conceal the extent and nature of their extrajudicial activities. They ran the risk of having to sit as judges on
policies or legislation on which they had earlier consulted. For
example, Brandeis participated in the court test of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, United States v. Butler,47 but he main-

tained a low profile by writing no opinion and simply signing
Justice Stone's dissent.48
431d.345-63.

441d.302.
45 Id. 251.
46 Id.

47297
U.S. 1 (1936).
4
8But

in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), Brandeis pro-

vided the necessary fifth vote to uphold the Social Security Act, including the unemployment insurance provisions with which he had been so closely involved.

For

other cases of this sort in which he participated, see B. Murp y, supra note 6, at 54.
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The United States Supreme Court would be a poorer institution had not Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter served on it. They
must rank among the great justices, and their extralegal activities
undoubtedly contributed to the general welfare. Concealment of
those activities was a necessary condition for their reputations and
perhaps for their continued service on the Court (consider the
crucifixion of Justice Fortas for his contacts with President Johnson). And for practical purposes the question whether Brandeis
and Frankfurter acted improperly has become, in a way, irrelevant.
Murphy concludes:
While it may have been possible once to see the harm not
in the activity but in its possible disclosure, and the problem in how best to prevent public scandal, such distinctions are no longer realistic. It is a fact of post-Watergate
political life that activities in which past justices participated with impunity can no longer be undertaken without
very high risk of disclosure, and this fact alone must
change our attitude toward the enforcement of whatever
49
standards of justice are established.
491d. 344. On the issue of concealment, it is instructive to review the principal biography of Brandeis, A. MASON, supra note 9, in the light of Murphy's
revelations. It is clear that Alpheus Mason, writing in 1946, had no idea of the
"Brandeis-Frankfurter connection," although there are occasional references to
Frankfurter as one of Brandeis' close friends. Mason does have a chapter entitled
Wilson's Adviser, which gives some indication of his World War I status. In a
later chapter entitled Extrajudicial Activities, Mason writes: "There is not a little
evidence that work on the Court failed fully to satisfy his zeal for constructive

endeavor." Id. 584. But Mason then continues: "Though still at heart a reformer,
his activities now were much circumscribed .

. .

. Furthermore, he gratuitously

enlarged even the normal strictures imposed by the judicial function, refusing to
make public addresses or write for publication on matters unrelated to his Court
work." Mason then quotes Stone's comment about Brandeis: "He was strongly
of the belief that a Justice of the Court should devote himself, single-mindedly to
his duties as a Justice, without undertaking to engage in any outside activities." Id.

